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Abstract
In a memorable scene from the …lm ”A Beautiful Mind,” John Nash explains to
his friends how to direct their attentions to women in a bar. Game theorists who have
seen the …lm point out that the proposed solution is not a Nash equilibrium. Here we
determine the Nash equilibria to the attention game. The symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium has resembles a common property resource problem. It has perverse com-
parative static properties that are not borne out by experimental data. Finally, we
discuss alternative ways of formulating the game.
Keywords: coordination, Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibrium, common
property resource problem, comparative statics.
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1”If everyone competes for the blond, we block each other and no one gets her. So then we all
go for her friends. But they give us the cold shoulder, because no one likes to be second choice.
Again, no winner. But what if none of us go for the blond. We don’t get in each other’s way, we
don’t insult the other girls. That’s the only way we win. That’s the only way we all get [a girl.]”
(from A Beautiful Mind: The Shooting Script, Akiva Goldsman, 2002)
1 Introduction
In a scene in the Oscar-winning movie ”A Beautiful Mind,” John Nash (played by Russell
Crowe) and several male colleagues are discussing a group of women at a bar.1 There is a
blonde woman and several brunettes.2 The men agree that the blonde is the most desirable,
but that any one of the brunettes is better than no woman at all. First, suppose that all the
men devote their full attention to the blonde. Nash explains that this is not a reasonable
strategy combination because it will result in the men neutralizing their e¤orts with the
blonde so that none is successful. Further, the brunettes feel slighted, so the men have no
chance with them either. Instead, Nash suggests that the men ought to ignore the blonde
and each should concentrate on a (di¤erent) brunette. As the …lm sequence portrays, this
is a success. Any game theorist who has seen the …lm will point out that this scenario
is actually not a Nash equilibrium either for if all other men pair o¤ with brunettes, any
individual would prefer to hit on3 the blonde.
The scenario in which one male hits on the blonde and the others on the brunettes is one
type of Nash equilibrium. In this note we determine the set of Nash equilibria to the game.
As we show, with n male players there are 2n ¡ 1 equilibria. Each one can be characterized
by the set of men who devote all their attention to the brunettes. In each such equilibrium,
either a particular individual makes a play for the blonde with positive probability or does
not. The ”equilibrium” portrayed in the …lm - that all players choose brunettes and hence
no player plays for the blonde with positive probability - is the only combination that cannot
1”The phrase ’Game Theory’ is never uttered” (C-ville Weekly review, March 19, 2002); ”Math skills not
required” (New Yorker, April 8, 2002).
2Goldman (2002) refers to the other women as brunettes in the Cast (p.143) and we stay with this
terminology. There are four non-blondes in the …lm sequence.
3We use the American colloquial term ”hit on:” British readers may substitute ”chat up.”
2happen. We then concentrate on the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium to the game
and interpret it as a common property resource problem. In equilibrium, too much e¤ort is
devoted to the blonde. However, the more players there are, the lower the probability that
the blonde is hit on. We also show that the equilibrium masks a perverse comparative static
property. As one might expect, the more attractive the blonde, the greater the likelihood
that each man will hit on her. However, deeper analysis of this result indicates that it
conceals a surprising property of the mixed strategy equilibrium. If only one player …nds the
blonde more attractive (than the others …nd her), his equilibrium probability of hitting on
her falls, while the probability played by the others rises! We conclude with a discussion of
other applications and other solution mechanisms.
2 Equilibria
Suppose that the game is as follows. There are n (male) players as well as one blonde and
at least n brunettes. Each male must decide which of the women to hit on. Suppose the
brunettes are equally attractive to the men, with appeal b.4 The blonde is more attractive,
with appeal a > b. If more than one man attempts to hit on the blonde, they succeed neither
with the blonde, nor any brunette (the latter feel slighted). Any man choosing not to hit on
the blonde succeeds with a brunette, for a payo¤ of b. If a man is the only one who hits on
the blonde, he succeeds.5
Clearly there are n pure strategy (asymmetric) equilibria in which any one of the men
pairs with the blonde, while each of the others pairs with a brunette. These are the only
pure strategy equilibria. They su¤er from the drawback that there are many of them, so it
is not clear to the players which one they should focus on.6 Faced with a similar problem
of how to select among the multitude of equilibria, previous authors have suggested looking
4We assume they are all equivalent to all males, and do not distinguish outcomes in which di¤erent males
go to di¤erent brunettes.
5The analysis is unchanged if each man believes he will succeed. Even if there is a probability the blonde
rejects a single suitor, a can re‡ect the probability of success times the probability if successful.
6Nash’s advice to his friends could be interpreted as an attempt to get them to focus on the equilibrium
in which Nash gets the blonde: see below.
3at the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, in which players independently make random
choices.
At a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, each male must be indi¤erent between
following the blonde and brunette strategies, or else he would concentrate only on the pre-
ferred alternative. Let the probability that each other male plays ”blonde” be P. Then
indi¤erence requires that
b = a(1¡ P)
n¡1;








We showin the Appendix that this is the only equilibrium in which all players randomize or
mix their strategies; that is, all players who choose randomly do so with the sameprobability.
However, there are also equilibria at which some mix and the rest choose ”brunette:”
each player either restricts himself to a brunette, or else hits on the blond with some positive
probability. With n players, and these two options, this yields 2n possibilities. Each of these
cases is an equilibrium except for the case when no player ever hits on the blonde. This
means that there are 2n¡1 di¤erent equilibria. Ironically, the only one of the 2n possibilities
that is not a Nash equilibrium (corresponding to the ”¡1”) is the one the …lm depicts, the
one is which the blonde gets no attention.
2.1 The tragedy of the commons
Wenow comparethe symmetricmixedstrategy equilibrium tothe optimal ex antesymmetric
arrangement whereby the common probability is to be chosen so as to maximize the sum
of the bene…ts to the males. That is, we take as a constraint that the blonde must be
”allocated” via a contest with equal independent probabilities. This perspective enables us
to interpret the ine¢ciency of the symmetric equilibrium independent of the ine¢ciency of
independent random choices per se.
4The optimand in this (constrained) welfare maximization problem is then
max
P2[0;1]
W = bn(1¡ P) + an(1¡ P)
n¡1P:
The …rst term here is the probability-weighted payo¤ per player from playing ”brunette,”
summed over the n players. The second term is the probability-weighted payo¤ to a player
from playing ”blonde,” which pays o¤ only if no players are playing ”blonde,” again summed
over all n players.7
The objective function is increasing at P = 0 and decreasing at P = 1, so the optimal
choice of n then satis…es the …rst-order condition
W0(P)
n
= ¡b+ a(1¡ P)
n¡2(1 ¡ nP) = 0:
This is equivalent to
b = a(1¡ P)
n¡2(1¡ nP);
whichclearly has a unique root, which is therefore the unique maximum. Where it is positive,
the RHS is a strictly decreasing function ofP. The solutionis tobecomparedto that for the
equilibrium, i.e., b = a(1¡ P)
n¡1: since the function on the RHS exceeds the former one,
the social optimum solution involves a lower probability P that the players choose ”blonde.”
This result can be interpreted as a variant of the ”tragedy of the commons” whereby the
blonde takes the role of the common property resource. Each individual, in choosing to hit
on the blonde with positive probability, takes account only of his personal payo¤. He does
not internalize the fact that his decision to pursue the blonde reduces the chance that the
others might succeed with her. The equilibrium probability P is therefore too large from a
social perspective.
2.2 More players reduces the chances the blonde is hit on
At the symmetric equilibrium we have b = a(1¡ P)
n¡1. If there are more players (higher
n), the RHS of this expression must remain the same, meaning that P must fall to maintain
the equality.
7The skeptical reader can derive the welfare maximand by enumerating over all possible outcomes and
simplifying using the binomial theorem.
5The probability that the blonde is pursued when there are n players is 1 ¡ (1 ¡ P)n
(which is just one minus the probability she is not hit on). To see how this changes as a
function of n, denote the equilibrium probability when there are n players by Pn. We have
just shown that Pn > Pm, when m > n, while (1¡ Pn)
n¡1 = (1¡ Pm)
m¡1. This means that
(1¡ Pn)
n < (1 ¡ Pm)
m and hence the probability that the blonde is hit upon is decreasing
in the number of players.
2.3 Comparative statics that are ”right for the wrong reason”
In the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the probability that a player chooses ”blonde”





n¡1, as derived above. If the attractiveness of the blonde (as given by a) rises,
then so does the probability P. This agrees with the simple intuition that people strive
more for a prize of higher value. This conclusion obscures an odd feature underlying this
result. We consider separately the case of two players and of more than two, since they di¤er
somewhat.
In the two-player version, suppose we increase just oneplayer’s enthusiasm for the blonde.
Then, by the logic of the mixed strategy, this player’s equilibrium mixed strategy cannot
change because the other player must remain indi¤erent between the two pure strategies.
But the probability P played by the other player must increase in order for this player to
be indi¤erent after the valuation rises. When we raise the valuations of the other player in
turn, the same changes occur. The …nal outcome is that all probabilities rise. The way this
is achieved though is not intuitive: when the prize value increases for one individual it is the
other player who strives more while that individual does not.
The three-player (symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium) case is even stranger. Start
again from the benchmark where they all …nd the blonde equally attractive. If one of them
then becomes more enthused about the blonde, then his equilibrium probability of success
with her must decrease to satisfy his indi¤erence condition for mixing. This means that the
other players must increasetheir probabilities of pursuingthe blonde.8 Since theirenthusiasm
8This relies on the symmetry result proved in the Appendix that players with the same tastes who do
randomize do so with equal probabilities.
6for the blonde is unchanged, their equilibrium probability of success with her cannot change,
but since one rival (the other man whose tastes have not changed) has a higher probability of
pursuing the blonde, the other rival (the one whose enthusiasm has increased) must have a
lower probability. This is unlike the 2-player case, in which the probability was unchanged.
The end result from increasing all players’ enthusiasm for the blonde is that they all try
harder (in the sense of choosing ”blonde” with higher probability). However, as we increase
the players’ enthusiasm for the blonde one at atime, the comparative static result is perverse.
Namely, he who likes more strives less, while those unchanged strive more. The general case
yields similar results and is presented in the Appendix.
An economic application of some of the ideas we have discussed is the analysis of rival
…rms into new markets. Capra (1998) has examined a game of this kind and used laboratory
experiments toseewhether subjectschangetheir behavior inthe strange way predictedbythe
model when their payo¤s are altered. She looks at a version of the game phrased as whether
a …rm wishes to enter a market that is pro…table for one but not for two …rms. Entering
the market corresponds to playing blonde and gives lower payo¤ when both enter than when
both do not (i.e., play the ”safe” brunette strategy). Capra then considers increasing the
cost of playing the enter strategy. While this di¤ers somewhat from our thought experiment
of increasing the attractiveness of getting the blonde, this also yields perverse comparative
static mixed strategy equilibrium predictions.
Capra (1998) uses 120 subjects, each in a game played only once in order to eliminate any
repeated game or reputation e¤ects. For the symmetric treatment, she …nds that observed
behavior is almost exactly predicted by the symmetric mixedstrategy.9 Capra thenconsiders
a treatment in which one agent’s payo¤s are increased whenever she enters the market.
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium predicts that this agent’s entry probability should
remain unchanged while the other agent’s entry probability should rise (to keep the …rst
type indi¤erent because now the attractiveness of entry has risen for the …rst type but not
for the second). The data convincingly go the other way though. Goeree and Holt (2001)
present some further examples of laboratory experiments in which a change in payo¤s has
the subjects behaving very di¤erently from the predictions of Nash equilibrium.
9In the terminology of Goeree and Holt (2001) this truly is a ”treasure” treatment.
73 Discussion
We have tried to formalize the game portrayed in the movie as closely as possible to the way
it is described there. Each man chooses a woman to hit on, and if several choose the blond,
they all strike out. We have further assumed that the men have no problem in ensuring that
no more than one vies for the same brunette.
We emphasized the common property nature of the equilibrium in our claim that excess
e¤ort is devoted to the blonde in comparison to a symmetric mixed strategy optimum.
Economists might argue that one way to resolve the issue would be to specify property
rights to avoid the congestion problem. One could envisage a pre-pick-up lottery among the
men to determine beforehand who has the right to hit on whom. If the mens’ valuations
di¤ered, appropriate side-payments could be made (with the right to hit on the blonde being
traded).
As in the …lm, we have concentrated only on the perspective of the males. We have
not looked at the preferences of the women, nor how they can act strategically.10 Pareto
e¢ciency would also account for their tastes over possible matches. The properties of various
matching arrangements have long been the subject of analysis: see for example Gale and
Shapley (1962).
We described a simple one-shot game. More complex would be a ”war of attrition,”
played out in real time. Suppose that the longer a man stays trying with the blonde, the
lower are his chances with any brunette, but that a man can only succeed with the blonde
once all other males have given up. To make it interesting, the males would have di¤erent
success probabilities, and information on these would be revealed only over time.11
10Indeed, Varian (2002) notes that the Nash character ”didn’t look at the game from the woman’s per-
spective, a mistake no game theorist would ever make.”
11If all men knew their success probabilities from the outset, the equilibrium would resemble that described
in the Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ (1985) model of exit from a declining industry. Only the male with the best
chances (assuming the brunettes are still sure things) would even bother to start expending e¤ort to hit
on the blonde because all the others realize that he will out-endure them. Introducing updating of chances
makes the game more interesting.
8As a prediction of a social phenomenon, another reason (in addition to it being a re-
alization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium) why all might hit on the blonde is
that each could overestimate his chances. The idea goes back at least as far as Adam Smith
(1776).12 It helps explain why so many aspiring authors submit manuscripts despite miser-
able acceptance chances, and why so many would-be actors and screenwriters work in bars
and restaurants in Los Angeles.
We have pointed out that one economic application is the entry game in which several
…rms are contemplating entering an industry that is pro…table if there is only one …rm.
Another applicationis the simultaneous submissionof similar articles to the sametop journal
when a new topic comes to light. A twist on the model would be to consider several journals
(women) indecreasing order of attractiveness. We conjecture that thereis againa symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium, and that the excess e¤ort result is reduced as we descend the
quality ladder.
Finally, the …lm suggests the intriguing possibility that Nash was disingenuously manip-
ulating his buddies. Having persuaded them to think they should all go for brunettes, he
then gets up and walks toward the blonde. As it turns out, he walks on past her. But if they
are all convinced to play ”brunette,” then it is indeed a Nash equilibrium if he plays blonde.
4 Appendix
4.1 Symmetry
We show that in any equilibrium at which some players use non-degenerate mixed strategies,
all such players mix with identical probability. Let K denote the set of players using such
strategies, and let k be the number of these players (so that the remaining n¡k players play




(1 ¡ Pj) for all i 2 K;
12Smith argues in Chapter X of Book I of the Wealth of Nations that people systematically overestimate
their chances of success in any venture, both because of ”overweening conceit” in their own abilities to control
those factors that can be controlled,as well as their ”absurd presumption in their own good fortune” with
respect to those factors beyond their control.
9where Kni denotes the set of all players in the subset K except for i. Since this condition





must be the same for all mixers, so that the equilibrium probability is the same for all players
in K.
Call the equilibrium probability with k such players Pk. Then











k¡1. Since b < a, then
this probability is decreasing in k. This means that the blonde is less likely to be pursued
the more males who are competing for her. The equilibrium probabilities are described more
fully in the text: they are analogous to those for the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
as the number of players is increased.
4.2 Asymmetry
Let the attractiveness of the blonde be ¹ a for m of the players, and a for the other n ¡ m
players, where ¹ a > a. Let the corresponding probabilities of choosing to pursue the blonde
be denoted by Qm and Pm respectively.13 Then we know that P0 < Qn which is just the
result that the symmetric mixed strategy probability of pursuing the blonde is increasing in
the attractiveness of the blonde. However, we are interested in what happens if we increase
each player’s valuation one at a time. For players with the low valuation, the indi¤erence
condition is
b = (1¡ Pm)
n¡m¡1(1¡ Qm)
ma
where the …rst term corresponds to the n ¡ m ¡ 1 rivals with the same valuation, and the
second corresponds to the m rivals with the other valuation. This expression holds for m < n.
13Symmetry within each group follows from an argument similar to that in the …rst part of the Appendix.
10For players with the high valuation, the indi¤erence condition is
b = (1¡ Pm)n¡m(1 ¡ Qm)m¡1¹ a
and here the …rst term corresponds to the n ¡ m rivals with the other valuation, and the
second to the m ¡1 rivals with the same valuation. This expression holds for m > 0.
The ratio of these two expressions is
1 =
(1¡ Qm)a
(1 ¡ Pm)¹ a
(1)
so that the ratio of the choice probabilities of NOT pursuing the blonde is independent of
m and furthermore Qm < Pm.14 That is, the blonde is pursued more intensely by those who
…nd her less attractive. Moreover, substituting this ratio back into either of the preceding
formulae shows that the pursuit probability for either type is an increasing function of the
number of individuals with high valuations.15 This part at least accords with casual intuition
in the sense that all strive more when some become more enthused. However, this result has
again come about for an unusual reason. Increasing one man’s enthusiasm means his rivals
now strive more; but he has to strive less to keep them indi¤erent. As noted in the 3-player
case, he who cares more strives less, but those who have not changed all strive more.
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